

# Gender Gaps in Political Information, But Not Political Sophistication

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## Abstract

The gender gap in factual political information – where men appear to know more than women – is widely documented. We extend research that argues for shifting the theoretical focus from factual recall to voters’ competence in completing a political task. We do not expect a gender gap in the latter case: even if women are less factually informed, they have comparable incentives to gain the sophistication necessary to make competent choices. We evaluate this expectation with unique data from the 2009 German election. We find men possessed significantly more factual information about German politics. But, there is no difference in men’s and women’s knowledge about the policy stances of various potential multi-party coalitions – knowledge crucial for the task at hand: voting. Our findings highlight the importance of connecting measures to theoretically relevant questions.

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Political information is an important commodity when it comes to making political decisions. A sizeable literature explores levels, sources, and consequences of factual information. The work generally finds gender gaps with men possessing more information than women (e.g., [Jerit and Barabas, 2017](#)). In this note, we follow work on political competence (e.g., [Lupia, 2015](#)) and discursive sophistication ([Kraft, 2024](#)) to offer the new theoretical concept of task sophistication. We theorize and find, with data from the 2009 German election, that women may have less factual information but are not less sophisticated in completing political tasks.

## **Gender Gaps, Information, and Sophistication**

Most work documenting gender gaps in political information uses measures of factual knowledge. The exact size of the gap depends on question format, answer options, and difficulty ([Fortin-Rittberger, 2016](#); [Ferrin, Fraile and García-Albacete, 2018](#)). As intimated, some authors argue for a reconceptualization away from factual information toward competence in making a discrete decision ([Lupia, 2015](#); [Althaus, 2018](#)). While the latter construct appears under various guises, we refer to this as task sophistication.

Factual information comes from knowledge stored in long-term memory that can be accessed in response to survey questions. Task sophistication differs. Extant work, taken together, suggests four components. First there is “a civic competence [that] refers to a citizen’s ability to accomplish well-defined tasks in roles such a voter, juror, bureaucrat, or legislator” (i.e., there is a defined task) ([Lupia, 2015](#), p. 31). Second, succeeding entails having effective procedural memory (how to do something) rather than declarative memory (recollection of facts) ([Lupia, 2015](#); [Kraft, 2024](#)). Third, task sophistication requires at least some (narrowly defined) constraint. One cannot competently complete a task if they hold inconsistent beliefs – such as thinking there can be increasing spending, decreasing revenues, and a balanced budget all at once ([Converse, 1964](#), p. 209). Finally, individuals anticipate the consequences of various actions/decisions (i.e., procedural memory leads to an understanding of outcomes from actions) ([Lupia and McCubbins, 1998](#)). Doing so enables

them to accomplish the task. For example, the task may be casting a vote that requires following the necessary steps to obtain a ballot and then use it appropriately. In some contexts, this is relatively simple but in others such as the U.S. it is complicated, leading to disparities reflecting processing skills (Holbein and Hillygus, 2020). Less sophisticated individuals do not anticipate how acting one way or another will lead to actually voting.

In sum, task sophistication entails combining information in a consistent manner to anticipate outcomes on a task. What matters is how people think, not the tidbits they know. The incorporation of procedural memory and constraint echoes Kraft's (2024) pioneering work on discursive sophistication. Our approach complements Kraft, as he focuses on the sophistication underlying expressed attitudes while we attend to sophistication on an acute task.

Unlike factual information, task sophistication is closely tied to the decisions that confront voters. Here, we care about relative task sophistication between men and women rather than assessing sophistication against some objective metric (see Druckman, 2014). We do not expect gender differences given there are not disparities in revealed motivation to influence politics (turnout, once corrected for self-report biases) (Stockemer and Sundstrom, 2023), practical information about government services (Stolle and Gidengil, 2010), or elaborative thinking (Kraft, 2024). Even if women possess relatively less factual information (and are less interested, engaged), they still will aspire to make competent decisions on a task (see Kraft, 2024, who finds no gender differences with regard to discursive sophistication). We thus do not expect gender differences on task sophistication.

## **Case Study: Coalition Politics in the 2009 German Elections**

Evaluation of gender differences in task sophistication entails identifying an ecologically valid task and having the appropriate measures. This has been challenging for extant work that often employs abstracted choices in laboratory settings (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Boudreau, 2009; Boudreau and Lupia, 2011). We study voting in a parliamentary democracy election, specif-

ically in Germany where multi-party coalitions are virtually assured after an election. The voting *task* here requires that voters assess not just the individual parties but also the possible coalitions that will form. Their vote for a party influences what coalition will form. For operational purposes, we focus strictly on policy. A (task) sophisticated voter is one who *predicts* the issue positions of potential coalitions by aggregating (using *procedural memory*) the positions of the parties in coalitions (Riambau, 2018). It further requires *constraint* since there is greater sophistication when a projected coalition position aligns with beliefs about the individual parties (i.e., a sophisticated voter would not believe that two left parties would implement right-wing policy). Anticipating coalition positions informs vote choice and affects accountability since voters electorally punish parties that they perceive as compromising too much in coalition governments (Fortunato, 2019).

Our specific data come from the 2009 German federal elections where possible coalition alliances were central themes of the campaign with traditional political issues being less present (Schoen, 2011). Indeed, forty percent of our survey respondents expected a coalition other than the one between the CDU/CSU and the FDP that actually formed (see Figure A.1 in the Supplementary Material). There also was significant coalition voting in the election (Huber, 2018).

## Data

Our data come from a wave of the Short-term Campaign Panel of the German Longitudinal Election Study 2009 (SCPGLES, Rattinger, 2013, N = 2,774). Details on the survey are in the SM. The survey is unique in including necessary measures that allow us to operationalize task sophistication. First, respondents placed the main parties – the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, DieGrünen, and Die Linke – on an ideology left-right scale.<sup>1</sup> Second, they reported their anticipated vote share for each of these parties. From these items we generate a metric of *coalition compromise position* on the left- right scale for the six coalitions that most would say could reasonably form: the Grand

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<sup>1</sup> The left-right scale tends to encapsulate most issues in politics, and it is considered the most important policy position statistic (Budge et al., 2001).

coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD), the Black-yellow coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP), the Red-green coalition (SPD and Die Grünen), the Traffic-light- coalition (SPD, FDP, and Die Grünen), the Jamaica-coalition (CDU/CSU, FDP, and Die Grünen), and the Red-red-green coalition (SPD, Die Linke, and Die Grünen). For example, for an SDP-FDP coalition, we add a respondent's placement of the SDP multiplied by their relative vote share (in the coalition) to the respondent's placement of the FDP multiplied by their relative vote share (e.g., [Martin and Vanberg, 2019](#)). In the SM, we show the results are robust when using an alternative measure from Albarello [Albarello \(2024\)](#).

Third, the survey asked respondents to place each of the six coalitions, independent of their specific party placements – that is, what policy would the coalition agree upon and implement or their *coalition placements*. A sophisticated voter would match their perceptions of the coalition members' individual positions (weighted) to where they believe the coalition would be (i.e., successfully combining relevant pieces of information into aggregate constrained forecasts to predict the consequences of their vote choice). We capture this by computing the absolute differences between respondents' *coalition compromise positions* and *coalition placements*, taking the negative of these values so that higher scores indicate greater matching or sophistication.

We standardize the negative absolute distance for each coalition and take the average across the six coalitions for each respondent to generate an overall sophistication score for each respondent.<sup>2</sup> For ease of interpretation, we further standardize this individual measure to obtain our final measure of sophistication. Clearly, a voter benefits if they can anticipate the positions of different coalition possibilities in ways that align with their perceptions of the parties' positions. The measure has additional benefits of evading social desirability bias (e.g., there are not “preferred responses”), and topics with obvious gender biases that can skew measures.

The SCPGLES data also have seven factual political information questions that we can compare to task sophistication, with the expectation that we will find the typical gender differences here but not with task sophistication (see the SM). Additionally, the survey includes questions about political interest and self-reported participation with which we can also look for gender gaps. The

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
<sup>2</sup> When we examine each coalition separately, the main results remain unchanged.

SCPGLES contains data about the respondents’ gender, age, education, socioeconomic status (employment, marital status, religion, citizenship, income, residence). We report descriptive statistics in Table A.1 in the Supplementary Material.

## Results

We first regress factual information, political interest, and self-reported participation on gender along with age, education, and socioeconomic status. We present the results in Figure 1 that include age and education in addition to gender (since prior work show those two variables also correlate with these outcomes). Consistent with prior work, we find that women possess less political information, exhibit significantly lower interest in politics, and report participating less. Moreover, age and education have positive and significant effects on the three metrics. These results affirm that the “typical” gender gaps manifest in our data.

**Figure 1: Gender and Political Information, Interest, and Participation**




Estimated Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals for OLS models with dependent variables: Political Information, Interest in Politics, and Political Participation respectively (with robust standard errors). Full regression tables in Table A.3, A.4, and A.5 in the Supplementary Material. Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area).

We find that sophistication and factual information correlate at 0.167 ( $p < .001$ ). This reveals convergent validity but that the magnitude is modest makes clear that sophistication and information are distinct constructs. In Figure 2, we present the results from regressing each individual information item on sophistication (with controls). The results show that sophistication relates more consistently to information items that would be relevant to computing coalition placement, particularly the vote share aspect (e.g., the legislative vote threshold, which vote counts for seats).

The less significant variable are more technical points (who elects the Chancellor) or current affairs (current majority in the Bundesrat). These results support our measure’s validity and clarify that some information is important to be sophisticated (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).

**Figure 2: Sophistication and Type of Information Questions**




Estimated Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals for OLS models with independent variable: Sophistication (with robust standard errors). Full regression tables in Table A.6 in the Supplementary Material. Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not).

Finally, we regress sophistication on gender, the demographic variables, as well as political information, interest, and participation. (The results are unchanged if we exclude the latter variables to match the analyses underlying Figure 1; see Table A.7 in Supplementary Material.) Figure 3 shows that, as predicted, we do not find any relationship between sophistication and gender. The parameter estimate for gender is close to zero with confidence intervals well beyond the zero line in both directions. Otherwise, we find an expected positive result for education (which presumably provides skills), and a negative effect for age, meaning younger respondents are more sophisticated. The latter contrasts with the information result; this might reflect the developmental state of psycho-social skills that make full engagement (e.g., obtaining information), but not sophistication, more difficult for younger people (Holbein and Hillygus, 2020).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The results are robust to a series of checks which we report in the Supplementary Material. This includes variation in models with different variables (Table A.7), with demographic weights from the micro-census 2009 for the German electorate (Table A.8), and with an alternative measure of coalition policy developed by Albarello (2024) (Table A.9). Additionally, the results are robust to excluding one coalition possibility at a time (Table A.10), ensuring that no idiosyncratic

**Figure 3: Gender and Sophistication**



Estimated Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals for OLS models with dependent variable: Sophistication (with robust standard errors). Full regression tables in Table A.7 in the Supplementary Material. Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not).

## Measurement Properties

While our argument centers on conceptualization, there are inevitable questions about measurement. Sophistication in our case pertains to voting and thus it should correlate with respondent's actual vote choice (e.g., more sophisticated voters should utilize their coalition placement forecasts more in voting). We run multinomial logit models with dependent variable vote choice. We evaluate the relevance of the independent variables with likelihood ratio tests that use the full models and impose a single exclusion restriction of one variable at the time. We report the likelihood ratio test statistic  $\chi^2$  p-values in Table 1 that includes the target variables we have previously discussed. We find clear statistical evidence for the relevance of sophistication: the p-value of the  $\chi^2$  statistic of the likelihood ratio test for excluding sophistication as a regressor is of the same magnitude of the analogous p-values for excluding common variables of vote choice such as age, education, political coalition, such as the incumbent coalition, drives the findings. They are also robust to excluding respondents who place all parties at the same position on the left-right scale (Table A.11), ensuring that the results are not influenced by respondents who may not have engaged meaningfully with the survey.

information, and interest. It is interesting that factual information is also impactful, presumably capturing a distinct element of reasoning.

**Table 1: Vote Choice**

	Likelihood ratio test for excluding Sophistication		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\chi^2$ p-value	0.003***	0.021**	0.045**
Observations	1,338	1,113	1,111
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,267.218	3,513.371	3,497.230
Socio-Economic Controls	–	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	–	–	✓


  

	Likelihood ratio test for excluding:					
	Gender	Age	Education	Information	Interest	Participation
$\chi^2$ p-value	0.383	0.006***	0.074*	<0.001***	0.072*	<0.001***
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,497.230	3,497.230	3,497.230	3,497.230	3,497.230	3,497.230
Socio-Economic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Multinomial logit models. Dependent variable: Vote Choice. Socio-Economic Controls: Gender, Age (-34, 35-49, 50-64, 64-), Education (no High School, High School, University), Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information [0,1], Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

We additionally evaluate whether sophistication correlates with accurately placing parties on the left-right scale by using objective placement from country expert data from The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2015). We compute the absolute distance between each respondent’s party placements and the experts’ party placements, and then take the negative average over the five parties so that higher scores indicate more accuracy. We regress this score on sophistication with full controls. Figure 4 presents the results (as well as results for factual information), showing that sophistication but not factual information significantly and positively correlates with accuracy. Here, a one standard deviation change in sophistication would have an estimated change of 0.3 units in accuracy, which is a substantial effect on a 10-point scale. Taken together, the results make clear that sophistication is unique from information, used by voters, and correlates with relatively objective indicators.

**Figure 4: Parties Left-Right Position Agreement with Experts**



Estimated Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals for OLS models with dependent variable: Parties Left-Right Position Agreement (with robust standard errors). Full regression tables in Table A.12 in the Supplementary Material. Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not).

In the SM, we show that those higher in sophistication also have less uncertainty in the party placements, offering even more predictive validity evidence. We additionally evaluate measurement bias by looking at the relationship between sophistication and “don’t know” responses; we find no evidence of bias.

## Conclusion

Our intent is not to minimize the possible relevance of the gender gap in factual information. Instead, we accentuate that factual information theoretically differs from task sophistication which is likely a more proximate driver of good decision-making (Lupia, 2015; Kraft, 2024). When it comes to sophistication, there is no reason to expect gender differences and, in our data, we do not find gender variation. Our work complements Kraft’s (2024) broader demonstration of no gender gap when it comes to discursive sophistication.

Of course ours is one analysis and it is possible that in other contexts there are gender differences in sophistication. This could most notably occur if there are key pieces of information relevant to sophistication and women do not access that information (e.g., in our case, party’s positions). This raises the question of which information is necessary to perform a given political task. Scholars who have studied gender and information have touched on this question by looking at gendered information (e.g., Stolle and Gidengil, 2010), but clearly more work is needed here. Some factual information matters more than other information. Along these lines, we encourage

future work to consider measures of task sophistication across settings and to design studies with the appropriate measures (rather than relying on existing data). Additional example applications include voting turnout, voting in referenda, jury decision-making, and persuasive argumentation. In each case, success (sophistication) requires an individual to take some information, aggregate it, and anticipate how their action will impact an outcome. The emphasis lies in how to do a task to arrive at a preferred outcome rather than remembering facts that may or may not be relevant. Care in specifying one's concepts is vital in efforts to understand when and how differences between groups and individuals.

## **Data Availability Statement**

Full replication material will be made available on BJPoS Dataverse.

## **Supplementary Material**

Supplementary material will be made available online.

## **Competing Interests**

The authors declare none.

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# Supplementary Material

## A.1 Details of Survey

The SCPGLES is a high-quality online panel, encompassing nearly 65,000 active panelists in Germany in 2009 (Rattinger et al., 2013) (Panelists are excluded if they report inconsistent information or do not participate for a year.) SCPGLES uses quota sampling on age, gender, and education. We also replicate the results with demographic weights from the 2009 German electorate micro-census (Table A.8). We utilize data primarily from the sixth wave of the SCPGLES that was conducted during the ten days preceding the September 27th election and includes 2,774 respondents eligible to vote in the 2009 elections.


Some political information items and the question on political interest were asked several times for different respondents in the previous waves. Hence, we only utilize the respondent's first answer to each question to avoid learning bias. Similarly, political participation was asked only to a subset of the respondents in wave six, but several times in the previous waves. Thus, we utilize the respondent's mean answer to increase data coverage for political participation.

For vote choice, we use intended vote choice for the second vote at the following elections. We used responses from the same wave 6 as for the other measures.

**Table A.1: Proportion of Respondents**

Variable	Level	All Waves	Wave 1 (Jul 10-20)	Wave 2 (Jul 24-Aug 2)	Wave 3 (Aug 7-17)	Wave 4 (Aug 21-31)	Wave 5 (Sep 4-13)	Wave 6 (Sep 18-27)	Wave 7 (Sep 29-Oct 7)
Gender:	Men	50.0	49.5	50.2	50.2	50.7	51.3	51.2	50.0
	Women	50.0	50.5	49.8	49.8	49.3	48.7	48.8	50.0
Age:	-34	35.1	36.1	34.2	33.8	33.3	32.5	33.5	33.3
	35-49	33.0	32.9	32.8	32.7	32.7	33.5	33.5	34.1
	50-64	24.6	23.9	25.5	25.9	26.5	26.1	25.6	25.2
	65-	7.2	7.1	7.4	7.6	7.6	7.9	7.5	7.3
Education:	No High School	23.5	24.6	22.0	21.6	20.1	20.2	19.3	19.5
	High School	43.7	42.6	45.0	44.2	44.7	44.8	44.7	45.1
	University	32.8	32.8	33.0	34.3	35.2	35.0	36.0	35.4
Employment:	Employed	65.4	66.1	63.9	64.8	64.3	63.7	64.0	64.3
	Unemployed	12.3	12.6	12.7	12.1	12.3	12.6	12.1	12.2
	Retired	13.1	12.3	13.9	13.7	14.0	14.3	14.0	13.4
	Student	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.7	7.9
	Other	2.0	1.8	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
Marital Status:	Single	39.7	40.1	39.3	39.5	38.9	38.6	39.7	40.0
	Married	42.8	42.4	43.1	43.2	44.2	44.5	43.2	43.4
	Married but living separated	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.1
	Civil union	2.9	3.1	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.5
	Divorced	10.3	10.2	10.6	10.3	10.2	10.3	10.3	10.0
	Widowed	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0
Religion:	Religious	34.9	35.1	34.9	35.1	36.3	35.4	35.0	35.0
	Not religious	65.1	64.9	65.1	64.9	63.7	64.6	65.0	65.0
Citizenship:	Citizen	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.3	2.9
	Not citizen	96.8	96.8	96.8	96.9	96.8	96.9	96.7	97.1
Income:	Up to 1499 Euro	28.2	28.3	28.2	28.0	27.2	27.5	27.9	27.6
	1500 – 2999 Euro	45.9	45.9	45.9	46.4	46.7	46.5	46.0	45.5
	3000+ Euro	25.9	25.8	25.9	25.6	26.2	26.0	26.1	26.9
Residence:	City	35.6	35.9	35.6	35.1	35.1	35.6	34.8	35.3
	Town	31.4	31.7	31.4	31.5	31.5	31.3	31.7	31.6
	Rural area	33.0	32.5	33.0	33.4	33.4	33.0	33.4	33.2
Interest in Politics:	Extremely interested	4.4	4.6	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.0	3.5
	Very interested	14.1	14.9	13.6	13.7	13.2	12.7	12.9	12.8
	Moderately interested	40.5	40.9	40.2	39.9	39.8	39.5	38.8	39.8
	Slightly interested	30.9	30.0	31.7	31.8	32.8	33.5	33.4	33.2
	Not interested at all	10.1	9.6	10.3	10.6	10.2	10.6	10.8	10.7
Political Information:	Below median	49.6	50.5	47.8	45.0	45.2	44.2	42.9	43.2
	Above median	50.4	49.5	52.2	55.0	54.8	55.8	57.1	56.8
Political Participation:	Will surely vote	39.8	40.3	40.4	40.4	39.5	38.8	38.5	38.3
	Will not	60.2	59.7	59.6	59.6	60.5	61.2	61.5	61.7
Respondents:		4, 552	3, 771	3, 689	3, 401	3, 129	3, 002	2, 774	2, 658

**Figure A.1: Predicted Coalition**



Total number of respondents: 3.002. 95 respondents did not answer the question.


## A.2 Factual Information Items

These included questions about the Bundestag (lower chamber) vote threshold, which votes count for Bundestag seats, what ballot secrecy means, the number of federal states, what overhang seats means, who elects the Chancellor, and the current majority in the Bundesrat (upper chamber). The questions are closed-ended, except when they require a numeric answer. For each question, we create a dummy variable coded as 1 if the respondent answers correctly and 0 otherwise (including non-answers and “don’t know”), so that higher scores indicate greater information.<sup>1</sup> We then take the average score across these items.

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<sup>1</sup> The gender gap in political information sometimes partially stems from counting “don’t know” responses as incorrect and women being more likely to respond “don’t know” (e.g., Mondak and Anderson, 2004). For us, however, the inclusion or exclusion of non-answers and “don’t know” responses as incorrect answers does not affect the information results we report in the next section. Indeed, we replicate the main finding on the gender gap in political information excluding non-answers and “don’t know” responses in Figure A.2, corresponding to Figure 1 in the main text.

**Figure A.2: Gender and Political Information, Excluding Non-Answers and “Don’t Know”**




Estimated Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals for OLS models with dependent variable: Political Information (with robust standard errors). Full regression tables in Table A.13 in the Supplementary Material. Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area).

### A.3 Uncertainty

In Figure A.3 in the Supplementary Material, we look at the relationship between sophistication and the uncertainty of placing of parties on the left-right scale. We find that those with more sophistication (those in the fourth quartile of sophistication) significantly place parties with less uncertainty compared to respondents with less sophistication (those in the first quartile of the understanding sophistication measure) for each of the five parties in the survey.

**Figure A.3: Parties Left-Right Position Placement Uncertainty**



Uncertainty in placing parties on the left-right scale for low levels of Sophistication (First Quartile) and high levels of Sophistication (Fourth Quartile). P-values for the F test comparing the variances of the first quartile and fourth quartile. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

The key gender coefficients become slightly smaller because the information measure increases when fewer incorrect answers (non-answers and “don’t know” responses) are counted, but there is no substantive or statistically meaningful difference with our main results.

## A.4 Don't Know Analyses

A long-standing question when it comes to measuring political information is how to treat “don't know” responses. This matters, for example, because women tend to answer “don't know” more than men and thus if those are counted as incorrect answers, that works against women registering as much information (e.g., Mondak and Anderson, 2004). This could, in theory, be the case for our sophistication measure well – for example, if women were less likely than men to answer the survey questions about the predicted vote share of parties or the ideological placement of parties that could bias the relationships we document. We thus evaluated propensity to response by gender. (As mentioned in an earlier note, our results regarding gender and political information are unaffected by how we treat non-answers and “don't know” responses to the information question.)

Specifically, we analyze the association between the propensity to answer the survey questions used to construct our measure of sophistication and respondents' gender, age, and education, controlling for the socio-economic and political engagement variables used in the analysis. We follow the approach developed by Fagerland, Stian and Petter (2017), who propose a two-step procedure to test for independence in  $2 \times 2 \times K$  contingency tables. The idea is to assess (and rule out) gender differences in non-response that could underlie our results.

First, we run a homogeneity test using the Pearson chi-squared tests for homogeneity across strata developed by Rao (1973). To obtain  $2 \times 2 \times K$  contingency tables, we dichotomize age and education at their median values and create all  $K$  stratified tables based on the possible combinations of the control factors. In each of the  $K$  stratified tables, we examine a dichotomized variable (gender, age, or education) and a dichotomized outcome (answering or not answering the question), for each combination of variables and survey questions.<sup>2</sup> We report the p-values for the Pearson chi-

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<sup>2</sup> We dichotomize the variables since there is no unified test for stratified associations between variables with more than two levels. An alternative would be to run separate exact Fisher tests of independence for each stratified contingency table and adjust for multiple comparisons. However, this test may be less sensitive to differences in propensities due to the high number of

squared tests for homogeneity across strata in the first three columns of Table A.2, with the number of strata containing only non-zero entries in brackets.<sup>3</sup> The results show that the homogeneity of the effect across strata cannot be rejected for any of the variables or survey questions.

Second, given that the effect is homogeneous across strata, we test whether the effect is statistically significant using the conditional independence Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel chi-squared test (Cochran, 1954; Mantel and Haenszel, 1959), which is widely regarded as the standard test for independence in  $2 \times 2 \times K$  contingency tables (Agresti, 2012). We report the p-values for this test in the second set of three columns in Table A.2. We find no statistically significant differences in the propensity to answer any survey questions by gender, age, or education.

In aggregate, the results in Table A.2 indicate that, unlike what happens for the political information questions, there is no difference in the propensity to answer the political sophistication questions across groups, given the controls used. We report the full results of the regression analyses with the complete set of controls in Tables A.15–A.17. We also replicate the main results using dichotomized variables and interacted controls to match the conditions of the Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel chi-squared test in Figure A.4 and Table A.18.

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strata and the relatively small number of observations. As shown in Table A.14, this test yields the same conclusions.

<sup>3</sup> Only strata with all non-zero entries contribute to the tests of independence. See Fagerland, Stian and Petter (2017) for more details.

**Table A.2: Propensity to Answer Survey Questions, Independence Tests with Dummy Variables**

	Homogeneity Tests:			Conditional Independence Tests:		
	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education
Vote share parties:						
CDU/CSU	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]	1 [18]	0.816 [11]	1 [8]
SPD	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]	1 [18]	0.816 [11]	1 [8]
FDP	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]	1 [18]	0.816 [11]	1 [8]
Die Grünen	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]	1 [18]	0.816 [11]	1 [8]
Die Linke	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]	1 [18]	0.816 [11]	1 [8]
Left-right parties:						
CDU/CSU	0.998 [19]	0.993 [11]	1 [12]	0.859 [19]	0.506 [11]	0.503 [12]
SPD	0.999 [19]	0.993 [11]	0.995 [11]	1 [19]	0.506 [11]	0.476 [11]
FDP	1 [21]	0.993 [11]	0.998 [10]	1 [21]	0.506 [11]	0.62 [10]
Die Grünen	0.999 [20]	0.996 [11]	0.999 [11]	0.728 [20]	0.649 [11]	0.634 [11]
Die Linke	0.999 [18]	0.982 [9]	0.993 [10]	1 [18]	0.312 [9]	0.612 [10]
Left-right coalitions:						
CDU/CSU+SPD	1 [20]	0.999 [10]	0.994 [11]	1 [20]	0.636 [10]	0.35 [11]
CDU/CSU+FDP	1 [18]	0.999 [10]	0.997 [12]	0.852 [18]	0.636 [10]	0.657 [12]
FDP+Die Grünen	1 [21]	1 [11]	1 [11]	0.864 [21]	0.648 [11]	0.351 [11]
SPD+FDP+Die Grünen	1 [19]	0.999 [10]	0.997 [12]	1 [19]	0.636 [10]	0.257 [12]
CDU/CSU+FDP+Die Grünen	1 [21]	1 [10]	1 [15]	1 [21]	0.463 [10]	0.413 [15]
SPD+Die Linke+Die Grünen	1 [20]	1 [9]	0.996 [10]	1 [20]	0.608 [9]	0.336 [10]

Homogeneity Tests: P-values for the Pearson chi-squared tests for homogeneity over strata. Conditional Independence Tests: P-values for the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel chi-squared test of conditionally independence in each stratum. Number of strata with all non-zero entries in brackets. Contingency tables for variables are stratified over the remaining variables, the Socio-Economic controls, and the Political Engagement controls. Socio-Economic controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

## A.5 Full Tables

**Table A.3: Gender and Political Information**

	Dependent variable: Political Information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.088*** (0.010)			-0.100*** (0.010)	-0.096*** (0.011)
Age 35-49		-0.006 (0.013)		0.018 (0.012)	0.032** (0.015)
Age 50-64		-0.011 (0.014)		0.048*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.019)
Age 65-		0.021 (0.018)		0.038** (0.018)	0.067** (0.030)
High School			0.074*** (0.016)	0.089*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.017)
University			0.193*** (0.015)	0.220*** (0.016)	0.185*** (0.017)
Socio-Economic Controls	-	-	-	-	✓
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753
R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.001	0.095	0.146	0.179
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	-0.0001	0.094	0.143	0.169

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.4: Gender and Interest in Politics**

	Dependent variable: Interest in Politics				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.102*** (0.009)			-0.103*** (0.009)	-0.114*** (0.010)
Age 35-49		0.002 (0.012)		0.017 (0.012)	0.025* (0.015)
Age 50-64		0.038*** (0.013)		0.070*** (0.013)	0.076*** (0.018)
Age 65-		0.087*** (0.016)		0.087*** (0.016)	0.090*** (0.027)
High School			0.033** (0.014)	0.060*** (0.014)	0.050*** (0.016)
University			0.083*** (0.015)	0.124*** (0.015)	0.106*** (0.017)
Socio-Economic Controls	—	—	—	—	✓
Observations	2,109	2,109	2,109	2,109	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.015	0.020	0.099	0.129
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.014	0.019	0.096	0.119

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.5: Gender and Political Participation**

	Dependent variable: Political Participation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.019** (0.008)			-0.020** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.009)
Age 35-49		0.008 (0.010)		0.016 (0.010)	0.024* (0.013)
Age 50-64		0.013 (0.011)		0.036*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.016)
Age 65-		0.042*** (0.013)		0.053*** (0.014)	0.060** (0.024)
High School			0.027** (0.013)	0.039*** (0.014)	0.030** (0.015)
University			0.067*** (0.013)	0.084*** (0.014)	0.059*** (0.015)
Socio-Economic Controls	—	—	—	—	✓
Observations	2,111	2,111	2,111	2,111	1,752
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.004	0.019	0.031	0.067
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.002	0.018	0.028	0.055

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.6: Sophistication and Type of Information Questions**

	Dependent variable: Information Question						
	(Bundestag Threshold)	(Which Vote)	(Secrecy Ballot)	(Federal States)	(Overhang Seats)	(Elects Chancellor)	(Current Majority)
Sophistication	0.039*** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.026** (0.011)	0.025** (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.004 (0.012)
Socio-Economic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,750	1,750	1,660	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
R <sup>2</sup>	0.166	0.112	0.063	0.077	0.182	0.105	0.053
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.153	0.099	0.048	0.062	0.169	0.091	0.038

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.7: Gender and Sophistication**

	Dependent variable: Sophistication					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women	0.033 (0.043)			0.001 (0.044)	0.004 (0.053)	0.017 (0.054)
Age 35-49		-0.151*** (0.055)		-0.129** (0.055)	-0.077 (0.082)	-0.094 (0.082)
Age 50-64		-0.290*** (0.058)		-0.203*** (0.060)	-0.183* (0.105)	-0.194* (0.107)
Age 65-		-0.369*** (0.076)		-0.302*** (0.080)	-0.363** (0.147)	-0.365** (0.149)
High School			0.274*** (0.074)	0.213*** (0.076)	0.202** (0.080)	0.174** (0.077)
University			0.398*** (0.072)	0.318*** (0.076)	0.290*** (0.083)	0.225*** (0.077)
Socio-Economic Controls	–	–	–	–	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	–	–	–	–	–	✓
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753	1,750
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003	0.016	0.018	0.027	0.035	0.061
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0002	0.015	0.017	0.024	0.024	0.046

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.8: Gender and Sophistication, Demographic Weights**

	Dependent variable: Sophistication					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women	0.068 (0.060)			0.019 (0.063)	-0.017 (0.072)	0.020 (0.077)
Age 35-49		-0.154** (0.071)		-0.118* (0.071)	-0.057 (0.090)	-0.100 (0.087)
Age 50-64		-0.291*** (0.077)		-0.180** (0.080)	-0.220 (0.141)	-0.266* (0.142)
Age 65-		-0.387*** (0.100)		-0.283*** (0.104)	-0.397** (0.178)	-0.450** (0.178)
High School			0.239*** (0.080)	0.191** (0.081)	0.176** (0.087)	0.133 (0.084)
University			0.376*** (0.077)	0.307*** (0.081)	0.255*** (0.089)	0.150* (0.081)
Socio-Economic Controls	-	-	-	-	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753	1,750
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.016	0.022	0.029	0.049	0.083
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.015	0.021	0.027	0.038	0.069

OLS models (with demographic weights and robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.9: Gender and Sophistication, Coalition Policy Measure Albarello (2024)**

	Dependent variable: Sophistication					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women	0.035 (0.044)			0.001 (0.045)	-0.005 (0.055)	-0.013 (0.055)
Age 35-49		-0.113** (0.056)		-0.105* (0.056)	-0.076 (0.082)	-0.080 (0.083)
Age 50-64		-0.271*** (0.059)		-0.225*** (0.061)	-0.219** (0.110)	-0.216* (0.114)
Age 65-		-0.418*** (0.085)		-0.376*** (0.089)	-0.474*** (0.157)	-0.462*** (0.160)
High School			0.243*** (0.076)	0.168** (0.078)	0.167** (0.085)	0.157* (0.083)
University			0.278*** (0.076)	0.183** (0.080)	0.155* (0.092)	0.132 (0.088)
Socio-Economic Controls	-	-	-	-	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Observations	2,005	2,005	2,005	2,005	1,669	1,667
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003	0.018	0.009	0.022	0.031	0.045
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0002	0.016	0.008	0.019	0.019	0.030

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.10: Gender and Sophistication, Excluding Coalitions**

Excluding grand coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women	0.033 (0.043)			0.002 (0.044)	0.015 (0.053)	0.033 (0.053)
Age 35-49		-0.143** (0.056)		-0.122** (0.056)	-0.090 (0.081)	-0.106 (0.081)
Age 50-64		-0.240*** (0.057)		-0.156*** (0.060)	-0.137 (0.102)	-0.150 (0.105)
Age 65-		-0.350*** (0.079)		-0.285*** (0.083)	-0.318** (0.149)	-0.322** (0.150)
High School			0.253*** (0.073)	0.206*** (0.075)	0.224*** (0.080)	0.198** (0.077)
University			0.370*** (0.072)	0.309*** (0.076)	0.301*** (0.084)	0.237*** (0.079)
Observations	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	1,747	1,744
Excluding black-yellow coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP)						
Women	0.037 (0.043)			0.005 (0.044)	0.006 (0.053)	0.017 (0.053)
Age 35-49		-0.167*** (0.054)		-0.145*** (0.054)	-0.102 (0.078)	-0.116 (0.078)
Age 50-64		-0.319*** (0.058)		-0.237*** (0.060)	-0.228** (0.102)	-0.236** (0.104)
Age 65-		-0.375*** (0.077)		-0.312*** (0.081)	-0.397*** (0.144)	-0.396*** (0.145)
High School			0.259*** (0.076)	0.191** (0.078)	0.167** (0.081)	0.144* (0.078)
University			0.390*** (0.074)	0.299*** (0.078)	0.258*** (0.084)	0.201** (0.079)
Observations	2,110	2,110	2,110	2,110	1,753	1,750
Excluding red-green coalition (SPD and Die Grünen)						
Women	0.029 (0.043)			-0.003 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.053)	0.010 (0.054)
Age 35-49		-0.156*** (0.055)		-0.135** (0.055)	-0.083 (0.081)	-0.099 (0.081)
Age 50-64		-0.293*** (0.058)		-0.206*** (0.060)	-0.197* (0.106)	-0.208* (0.108)
Age 65-		-0.361*** (0.073)		-0.293*** (0.077)	-0.353** (0.147)	-0.358** (0.149)
High School			0.286*** (0.074)	0.227*** (0.077)	0.203** (0.080)	0.175** (0.077)
University			0.400*** (0.073)	0.321*** (0.076)	0.285*** (0.083)	0.220*** (0.077)
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753	1,750
Excluding traffic-light-coalition (SPD, FDP, and Die Grünen)						
Women	0.015 (0.043)			-0.018 (0.044)	-0.014 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.054)
Age 35-49		-0.133** (0.055)		-0.111** (0.055)	-0.066 (0.081)	-0.083 (0.081)
Age 50-64		-0.255*** (0.058)		-0.171*** (0.060)	-0.155 (0.104)	-0.168 (0.107)
Age 65-		-0.360*** (0.075)		-0.299*** (0.079)	-0.356** (0.144)	-0.364** (0.146)
High School			0.267*** (0.073)	0.213*** (0.075)	0.214*** (0.080)	0.185** (0.077)
University			0.380*** (0.072)	0.312*** (0.076)	0.302*** (0.083)	0.238*** (0.077)
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753	1,750
Excluding jamaica-coalition (CDU/CSU, FDP, and Die Grünen)						
Women	0.037 (0.043)			0.010 (0.044)	0.017 (0.053)	0.025 (0.054)
Age 35-49		-0.130** (0.055)		-0.109** (0.055)	-0.060 (0.081)	-0.075 (0.081)
Age 50-64		-0.256*** (0.058)		-0.169*** (0.061)	-0.154 (0.104)	-0.162 (0.106)
Age 65-		-0.295*** (0.076)		-0.225*** (0.080)	-0.272* (0.146)	-0.270* (0.147)
High School			0.268*** (0.075)	0.220*** (0.078)	0.208** (0.081)	0.179** (0.078)
University			0.385*** (0.074)	0.320*** (0.078)	0.291*** (0.084)	0.229*** (0.078)
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753	1,750
Excluding red-red-green coalition (SPD, Die Linke, and Die Grünen)						
Women	0.055 (0.043)			0.019 (0.044)	0.022 (0.053)	0.031 (0.053)
Age 35-49		-0.149*** (0.056)		-0.128** (0.055)	-0.051 (0.085)	-0.069 (0.084)
Age 50-64		-0.303*** (0.058)		-0.220*** (0.060)	-0.164 (0.107)	-0.172 (0.109)
Age 65-		-0.416*** (0.080)		-0.347*** (0.083)	-0.383** (0.151)	-0.382** (0.152)
High School			0.270*** (0.072)	0.200*** (0.075)	0.180** (0.079)	0.149** (0.075)
University			0.395*** (0.071)	0.303*** (0.075)	0.265*** (0.083)	0.197*** (0.076)
Observations	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	1,748	1,745
Soc-E Cont	—	—	—	—	✓	✓
Pol En Cont	—	—	—	—	—	✓

OLS models with dependent variable: Sophistication (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.11: Gender and Sophistication, Excluding Respondents Placing All Parties the Same**

	Dependent variable: Sophistication					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women	0.030 (0.044)			-0.003 (0.045)	-0.010 (0.054)	0.014 (0.055)
Age 35-49		-0.135** (0.056)		-0.108* (0.056)	-0.059 (0.085)	-0.082 (0.085)
Age 50-64		-0.286*** (0.060)		-0.193*** (0.062)	-0.189* (0.110)	-0.200* (0.113)
Age 65-		-0.336*** (0.078)		-0.267*** (0.082)	-0.339** (0.153)	-0.339** (0.155)
High School			0.258*** (0.075)	0.200*** (0.077)	0.171** (0.081)	0.133* (0.078)
University			0.414*** (0.074)	0.337*** (0.078)	0.290*** (0.085)	0.208*** (0.079)
Socio-Economic Controls	-	-	-	-	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Observations	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	1,694	1,691
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0002	0.015	0.020	0.027	0.038	0.068
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0003	0.014	0.019	0.024	0.026	0.053

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.12: Parties Left-Right Position Agreement with Experts**

	Dependent variable: Parties Left-Right Position Agreement		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sophistication	0.291*** (0.026)	0.281*** (0.028)	0.277*** (0.029)
Information			-0.114 (0.108)
Socio-Economic Controls	–	✓	✓
Political Engagement Controls	–	–	✓
Observations	2,112	1,753	1,750
R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.170	0.202
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.160	0.189

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Gender, Age (-34, 35-49, 50-64, 64-), Education (no High School, High School, University), Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Political Engagement Controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.13: Gender and Political Information, Excluding Non-Answers and “Don’t Know”**

	Dependent variable: Political Information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.050*** (0.009)			-0.060*** (0.009)	-0.056*** (0.010)
Age 35-49		0.003 (0.012)		0.022** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.014)
Age 50-64		-0.006 (0.012)		0.042*** (0.013)	0.057*** (0.017)
Age 65-		0.010 (0.016)		0.028* (0.016)	0.059** (0.028)
High School			0.059*** (0.015)	0.070*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.016)
University			0.158*** (0.014)	0.179*** (0.015)	0.151*** (0.016)
Socio-Economic Controls	–	–	–	–	✓
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112	1,753
R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.0005	0.080	0.105	0.145
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	-0.001	0.079	0.103	0.134

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Socio-Economic Controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.14: Propensity to Answer Survey Questions, Fisher Independence Tests**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education
Vote share parties:						
CDU/CSU	0.045**	0.022**	<0.001***	0.138	0.008***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
SPD	0.045**	0.022**	<0.001***	0.138	0.008***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
FDP	0.045**	0.022**	<0.001***	0.138	0.008***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
Die Grünen	0.045**	0.022**	<0.001***	0.138	0.008***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
Die Linke	0.045**	0.022**	<0.001***	0.138	0.008***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
Left-right parties:						
CDU/CSU	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
SPD	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
FDP	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
Die Grünen	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
Die Linke	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
Left-right coalitions:						
CDU/CSU+SPD	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
CDU/CSU+FDP	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
FDP+Die Grünen	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
SPD+FDP+Die Grünen	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
CDU/CSU+FDP+Die Grünen	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]
SPD+Die Linke+Die Grünen	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	[1]	[1]	[1]	[12]	[6]	[8]

Minimum p-value for the Fisher's exact test of independence for contingency tables over all the stratified contingency tables. P-values adjusted for multiple comparisons with Holm method. Number of strata with all non-zero entries in brackets. Models reference numbers as in the main analysis in Table A.7 in the Supplementary Material. Contingency tables for variables in model 4 are stratified over the remaining variables. Contingency tables for variables in model 5 are stratified over the remaining variables and the Socio-Economic controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Contingency tables for variables in model 6 are stratified over the remaining variables, the Socio-Economic controls, and the Political Engagement controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.15: Propensity to Answer Survey Questions, Homogeneity Test, Dummy Variables**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)			(6)		
	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education
Vote share parties:												
CDU/CSU	-	-	-	0.97 [4]	0.599 [4]	0.591 [4]	0.995 [92]	0.947 [67]	0.885 [82]	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]
SPD	-	-	-	0.97 [4]	0.599 [4]	0.591 [4]	0.995 [92]	0.947 [67]	0.885 [82]	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]
FDP	-	-	-	0.97 [4]	0.599 [4]	0.591 [4]	0.995 [92]	0.947 [67]	0.885 [82]	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]
Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.97 [4]	0.599 [4]	0.591 [4]	0.995 [92]	0.947 [67]	0.885 [82]	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]
Die Linke	-	-	-	0.97 [4]	0.599 [4]	0.591 [4]	0.995 [92]	0.947 [67]	0.885 [82]	0.999 [18]	0.999 [11]	0.999 [8]
Left-right parties:												
CDU/CSU	-	-	-	0.233 [4]	0.285 [4]	0.07* [4]	0.998 [109]	0.94 [78]	0.97 [95]	0.998 [19]	0.993 [11]	1 [12]
SPD	-	-	-	0.228 [4]	0.3 [4]	0.078* [4]	0.996 [110]	0.986 [79]	0.954 [95]	0.999 [19]	0.993 [11]	0.995 [11]
FDP	-	-	-	0.301 [4]	0.275 [4]	0.121 [4]	0.999 [109]	0.991 [80]	0.952 [93]	1 [21]	0.993 [11]	0.998 [10]
Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.266 [4]	0.359 [4]	0.165 [4]	0.997 [106]	0.994 [78]	0.967 [93]	0.999 [20]	0.996 [11]	0.999 [11]
Die Linke	-	-	-	0.147 [4]	0.502 [4]	0.081* [4]	0.978 [105]	0.988 [80]	0.893 [95]	0.999 [18]	0.982 [9]	0.993 [10]
Left-right coalitions:												
CDU/CSU+SPD	-	-	-	0.025** [4]	0.35 [4]	0.02** [4]	0.95 [110]	0.894 [76]	0.871 [94]	1 [20]	0.999 [10]	0.994 [11]
CDU/CSU+FDP	-	-	-	0.029** [4]	0.472 [4]	0.022** [4]	0.961 [110]	0.884 [78]	0.919 [93]	1 [18]	0.999 [10]	0.997 [12]
FDP+Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.034** [4]	0.396 [4]	0.019** [4]	0.965 [109]	0.907 [77]	0.896 [93]	1 [21]	1 [11]	1 [11]
SPD+FDP+Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.046** [4]	0.354 [4]	0.033** [4]	0.803 [108]	0.86 [78]	0.904 [95]	1 [19]	0.999 [10]	0.997 [12]
CDU/CSU+FDP+Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.03** [4]	0.269 [4]	0.014** [4]	0.886 [110]	0.917 [78]	0.943 [97]	1 [21]	1 [10]	1 [15]
SPD+Die Linke+Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.029** [4]	0.368 [4]	0.011** [4]	0.861 [108]	0.916 [77]	0.82 [93]	1 [20]	1 [9]	0.996 [10]

P-values for the Pearson chi-squared tests for homogeneity over strata. Number of strata with all non-zero entries in brackets. Models reference numbers as in the main analysis in Table A.7 in the Supplementary Material. Models 1, 2, and 3 have only one stratum, and the homogeneity of the effect is trivial. Contingency tables for variables in model 4 are stratified over the remaining variables. Contingency tables for variables in model 5 are stratified over the remaining variables and the Socio-Economic controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Contingency tables for variables in model 6 are stratified over the remaining variables, the Socio-Economic controls, and the Political Engagement controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.16: Propensity to Answer Survey Questions, Conditional Independence Test, Dummy Variables**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education
Vote share parties:						
CDU/CSU	0.045** [1]	0.003*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	0.066* [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
SPD	0.045** [1]	0.003*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	0.066* [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
FDP	0.045** [1]	0.003*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	0.066* [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
Die Grünen	0.045** [1]	0.003*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	0.066* [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
Die Linke	0.045** [1]	0.003*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	0.066* [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
Left-right parties:						
CDU/CSU	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
SPD	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
FDP	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
Die Grünen	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
Die Linke	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
Left-right coalitions:						
CDU/CSU+SPD	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
CDU/CSU+FDP	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
FDP+Die Grünen	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
SPD+FDP+Die Grünen	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
CDU/CSU+FDP+Die Grünen	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]
SPD+Die Linke+Die Grünen	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [1]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]


Models 1, 2, and 3: P-values for the Fisher's exact test of independence for contingency tables. Models 4, 5, and 6: P-values for the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel chi-squared test of conditional independence in each stratum. Number of strata with all non-zero entries in brackets. Models reference numbers as in the main analysis in Table A.7 in the Supplementary Material. Contingency tables for variables in model 4 are stratified over the remaining variables. Contingency tables for variables in model 5 are stratified over the remaining variables and the Socio-Economic controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Contingency tables for variables in model 6 are stratified over the remaining variables, the Socio-Economic controls, and the Political Engagement controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Table A.17: Propensity to Answer Survey Questions, Fisher Independence Tests for Cases with No Homogeneity, Dummy Variables**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education
	Gender	Age	Education	Gender	Age	Education
Vote share parties:						
CDU/CSU	-	-	-	-	-	-
SPD	-	-	-	-	-	-
FDP	-	-	-	-	-	-
Die Grünen	-	-	-	-	-	-
Die Linke	-	-	-	-	-	-
Left-right parties:						
CDU/CSU	-	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	-
SPD	-	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	-
FDP	-	-	-	-	-	-
Die Grünen	-	-	-	-	-	-
Die Linke	-	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	-
Left-right coalitions:						
CDU/CSU+SPD	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	-
CDU/CSU+FDP	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	-
FDP+Die Grünen	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	-
SPD+FDP+Die Grünen	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	-
CDU/CSU+FDP+Die Grünen	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	-
SPD+Die Linke+Die Grünen	-	-	-	<0.001*** [4]	<0.001*** [4]	-

For the cases in which homogeneity is rejected in Table A.15, minimum p-value for the Fisher's exact test of independence for contingency tables over all the stratified contingency tables. P-values adjusted for multiple comparisons with Holm method. Number of strata with all non-zero entries in brackets. Models reference numbers as in the main analysis in Table A.7 in the Supplementary Material. Contingency tables for variables in model 4 are stratified over the remaining variables. Contingency tables for variables in model 5 are stratified over the remaining variables and the Socio-Economic controls: Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Contingency tables for variables in model 6 are stratified over the remaining variables, the Socio-Economic controls, and the Political Engagement controls: Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Figure A.4: Sophistication and Gender, with Dummy Variables and Interacted Controls**



Estimated Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals for OLS models with dependent variable: Sophistication (with robust standard errors). Full regression tables in Table A.18 in the Supplementary Material. Age is a dummy variable split at the median with value 1 for 43 years old and older. Education is a dummy variable split at the median with value 1 for completed high school onwards. Socio-Economic and Political Engagement interaction FE: interaction of Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area), Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not).

**Table A.18: Sophistication with Dummy Variables and Interacted Controls**

	Dependent variable: Sophistication					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women	0.024* (0.012)			0.014 (0.012)	0.007 (0.015)	0.046*** (0.017)
Age		-0.171*** (0.013)		-0.150*** (0.013)	-0.093*** (0.020)	-0.103*** (0.023)
Education			0.150*** (0.013)	0.127*** (0.012)	0.086*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.020)
Socio-Econ interaction FE	–	–	–	–	✓[288]	–
Socio-Econ + Pol Eng interaction FE	–	–	–	–	–	✓[945]
Observations	12,672	12,672	12,672	12,672	10,518	10,500
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003	0.014	0.011	0.022	0.260	0.620
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0002	0.014	0.011	0.022	0.239	0.582

OLS models (with robust standard errors). Age is a dummy variable split at the median with value 1 for 43 years old and older. Education is a dummy variable split at the median with value 1 for completed high school onwards. Socio-Econ interaction FE: interaction of Employment (employed, unemployed, retired, student, other), Marital Status (single, married, married but living separated, civil union, divorced, widowed), Religion (religious, not religious), Citizenship (citizen, not citizen), Income (up to 1499 Euro, 1500 – 2999 Euro, 3000+ Euro), Residence (city, town, rural area). Socio-Econ. + Pol Eng interaction FE: interaction of Socio-Econ. interaction FE with Interest in Politics (extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, not interested at all), Political Information (below median, above median), Political Participation (will surely vote, will not). Number of FE in brackets. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

## Supplementary Material References

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